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EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS - EFFECT OF TESTAMENTARY
PROVISIONS ON EXECUTORS' FEES -At the early English law an executor was entitled to the surplus of the personal estate after the payment
of debts and legacies,1 but this practice nowhere prevails today. At
common law the office of executor was regarded as honorary, to be performed without compensation unless the will expressly provided for
compensation}' It is doubtful if the common-law rule ever obtained in
this country,8 where from a very early time it has been universally
considered that executors are normally entitled to reasonable com-

·

1 Chamberlin's Appeal, 70 Conn. 363, 39 A. 734 (1898); II R. C. L. 230
(1915).
2 Gordon v. Greening, 121 Ark. 617, 182 S. W. 272 (1916); 24 C. J. 973
(1921).
8 42 YAI.l:! L. J. 771 (1933).
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pensation/ not only to reward them for their time, labor and trouble,
but also for the responsibility incurred and for the fidelity with which
they discharge the duties of their trust. 5 The tendency is to regard
executorship more as a business motivated on economic principles than
as a personal fidelity. 8 As a result of this changed concept of the office
of executor,_ only one state now follows the common-law rule, and
there it has been enacted into statute law. 7 All the other states permit
compensation in the absence of an express provision in the will to the
contrary. 8
Most of the states have statutes regulating executors' fees. These
statutes fall into four classes. Twenty-four states have statutes fixing
the amount, usually based on a percentage of the estate, and leaving no
discretion to the court.9 Eight states allow the court discretion, but fix
a maximum fee.10 Two states and the District of Columbia fix both a
maximum and minimum, leaving room for the exercise of a limited
discretion.11 Ten states give the court absolute discretion to award rea' Granberrfs Exr. v. Granberry, I Va. 246 (1793).
15
Walker's Estate, 13 Del. Ch. 439, 122 A. 192 (1923); 24 C. J. 974 (1921).
8 Clark's Estate, IO Pa. Dist. 378 (1901), stating at 379, "Experience has shown
that, as a general rule, cheap trustees are poor trustees, for the simple reason that the
measure of skill and attention lies in the compensation. Gratuitous services are not to
be expected in business relations."
7
La. Civ. Code Ann. (Dart, 1932), § 1686; Succession of Abrams, 145 La.
627, 82 So. 727 (1919). A slightly different view than the one taken above is expressed in II AM. & ENG. ENCYC. LAw, 2d ed., 1277 (1899).
8
In most cases this is statutory. Cf. I I AM. & ENG. ENcYc. LAw, 2d ed., 1277
(1899); I WoERNER, AMERICAN LAw OF ADMINISTRATION, 3d ed., § 524 (1923).
9
Ariz. Code (Struckmeyer, 1928), § 4051; Cal. Prob. Code (Deering, 1937),
§ 901; Fla. Comp. Gen. Laws (Perm. Supp. 1936), § 5541 (90); Ga. Code Ann.
(1935), §§ n3-2001, IJ3-2004; Idaho Code (1932), § 15-uo7; La. Civ. Code
Ann. (Dart, 1932), §§ 1683, 1684, 1685; Mich. Comp. LaW3 (1929), § 15928 as
amended by Mich. Pub. Acts (1939), c. 288 [Mich. Ann. Stat. (Supp. 1939), §
27.3178 (284)]; Mo. Rev. Stat. (1929), § 221; Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (Anderson
& McFarland, 1935), § 10287; Neb. Comp. Stat. (1929), § 3014u, as amended by
Neb. Laws (1937), c. 74, p. 263, Neb. Laws (1939), c. 31, p. 166; Nev. Comp.
Laws (Hillyer, 1929), § 9783; N. M. Stat. Ann. (Courtright, 1929), § 47-701;
N. Y. Sur. Ct. Act, § 285 [Cahill's Civ. Prac. 1937]; 2 N. D. Comp. Laws Ann.
(1913), § 8822; Ohio Code Ann. (Throckmorton, 1930), § 10837; Okla. Stat~
(1931), § 1332; I Ore. Code Ann. (1930), § u-7II; S. C. Code (1932), § 9017;
S. D. Comp. Laws (1929), § 3365; Tex. Rev. Code (Vernon, 1939), art. 3689;
Utah Rev. Stat. Ann. (1933), § 102-u-25; Vt. Pub. Laws (1933), § 9039; Wis.
Stat. (1931), § 317.08; Wyo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1931), § 88-2607.
10
Ala. Code (Michie, 1928), § 5923; Ark. Dig. Stat. (Pope, 1937), § 183;
Colo. Ann. Stat. (1935), c. 176, § 232; Iowa Code (1935), § 12063; Ky. Stat.
(Carroll, 1930), § 3883; Me. Rev. Stat. (1930), c. 75, § 43; N. J. Rev. Stat. (1937),
§ 3:u-2; N. C. Code Ann. (Michie, 1935), § 157.
11
D. C. Code (1929), tit. 29, § 265; Md. Ann. Code (Bagby, 1925), art. 93,
§ 5; Miss. Code Ann. (1930), § 1740.
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sonable compensation.12 Four states have adopted the discretionary
method by judicial decision.18
The obvious effect of most of these statutes is to fix an arbitrary fee
which may have little relation to the actual value of the services performed; hence testators are inclined to attempt to control the fees of
their executors to conform to what the testator thinks is a fair reward.
The purpose of this comment is to discuss the effect of testamentary
provisions upon executors' fees. Five major situations will be considered: (I) cases where the will expressly denies compensation; ( 2) cases
where compensation greater or less than the statutory amount is provided; (3) problems arising under statutes permitting renunciation of
the provisions of the will; (4) cases where the executor is also a legatee.i.. (5) cases where unusual extraneous circumstances exist.
I.

There are broad dicta to the effect that a testator has the power to
deprive his executor of all compensation by expressly so providing in
his will,1~ but the cases fail to bear out this position. One factor the
testator must consider is that the chosen executor may refuse to act
and that an executor substituted by the court would be entitled to the
usual compensation.111 The most drastic limitation on the testator's common-law right fo determine his executor's compensation by testamentary provision has been made by statutes enacted in twenty-four
states permitting an executor to renounce the specific compensation
provided in the will and claim the statutory fee. 111 Clearly such statutes
12 lll. Ann. Stat. {Smith Hurd, Supp. 1939), c. 3, § 490; Ind. Ann. Stat. (Burns,
1933), § 6-1416; Kan. Sess. Laws (1939), c. 180, § 147; Mass. Gen. Laws (1932),
c. 206, § 16; Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927), § 8788; R. I. Gen Laws (1938), c. 580,
§ 7; Tenn. Code Ann. (Michie, 1938), § 8250; Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1930), §
5425; Wash. Rev. Stat. (Remington, 1932), § 1528; W. Va. Code (1931), § 44-4-14.
18 Hayward v. Plant, 98 Conn. 374, 119 A. 341 (1923); Walker's Estate, 13
,
Del. Ch. 439, 122 A. 192 (1923); Tuttle v. Robinson, 33 N. H. 104 (1856);
Reid's Estate, 250 Pa. 103, 95 A. 392 (1915).
u Secor v. Sentis, 5 Red£. Sur. (N. Y.) 570 (1882); Hill v. Zanome, 184
Ark. 594, 43 S. W. (2d) 238 (1931); 24 C. J. 975 (1921).
15 Young v. Smith, 72 Ky. 421 (1872); Williams v. Roy, 9 Ont. Rep. 534
(1885).
16 Ariz. Code (Struckmeyer, 1928), § 4049; Cal. Prob. Code (Deering, 1937),
§ 900; Fla. Comp. Gen. Laws (Perm. Supp. 1936), § 5541 (90); Idaho Code
(1932), § 15-1105; Ind. Ann. Stat. (Bums, 1933) § 6-1417; Kan. Sess. Laws
(1939), c. 180, § 115; Mich. Comp. Laws (1929), § 15928, as amended by Mich.
Pub. Acts (1939), c. 288 [Mich. Ann. Stat. (Supp. 1939), § 27.3178 (284)];
Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927), § 8788; Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (Anderson & McFarland, 1935), § I0285; Neb. Comp. Stat. (1929), § 30-1410; Nev. Comp. Laws
(Hillyer, 1929), § 9781; N. J. Rev. Stat. (1937), § 3:11-5; N. M. Stat. Ann.
(Courtright, 1929), § 47-607; N. Y. Sur. Ct. Act, § 285 [Cahill's Civ. Prac. 1937];
N. D. Comp. Laws Ann. (1913), § 8821; Ohio Code Ann. (Throckmorton, 1930),
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make it possible completely to defeat the testator's intent. Problems
arising under these statutes will be considered later and for the present
some of the limitations set by the courts without the aid of statutes
will be examined.
One line of cases unequivocally holds that, even in the absence of a
statute permitting renunciation, an executor is entitled to the statutory
commissions notwithstanding a provision in the will that he shall be
entitled to no compensation,17 and that after full administration even
tpe court has no power to deprive him of the minimum fixed by law.18
These holdings proceed upon the rather dubious theory that the statute
setting a maximum and minimum fee places upon the court the power
and positive duty of allowing a fee somewhere between those limits and
that nowhere is such power given to the testator. The New Jersey
courts also in terms deny the testator's plenary power to deprive his
executor of compensation,19 but such statements were not essential to
the decisions since a New Jersey statute permitting renunciation reached
the same result. However, the majority view, at least as expressed
by way of dictum, is that the testator has the plenary power 20 to exclude compensation and that once the executor has performed the duties
of his office he is bound by the stipulation in the will, either on the
theory of estoppel 21 or contract.22 This view as stated in the cases seems
clear and definite, but has been so strictly construed in its application
to specific cases as to lose most of its e:ffect. The first qualification is
that a testamentary provision will not be construed as depriving the
executor of compensation if it may be construed otherwise with equal
reason. 28 Thus the provision, "It is my request that A, B and C will
consent to act as executors and that each of them other than-A do also
take and receive the full rate of commissions provided by law," was
held ambiguous and A not precluded from claiming statutory commissions.24 A provision that the executors shall "make no charge for distribution of legacies" was held not to prevent compensation for pre§ 10838; Okla. Stat. (1931), § 1330; 1 Ore. Code Ann. (1930), § n-709; S. D.
Comp. Laws (1929), § 3363; Utah Rev. Stat. Ann. (1933), § ro2-n-24; Vt. Pub.
Laws (1933), § 2819; Wash. Rev. Stat. (Remington, 1932), § 1528; Wis. Stat.
(1931), § 317.07; Wyo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1931), § 88-2606.
17 McKim v. Duncan, 4 Gill (Md.) 72 (1846); Handy v. Collins, 60 Md. 229
(1883).
15 Handy v. Collins, 60 Md. 229 (1883).
19 Tichenor v. Mechanics & Metals Nat. Bank, 96 N. J. Eq. 560, 125 A. 323
(1924); Heath v. Maddock, 83 N. J. Eq. 681, 94 A. 218 (1914).
20 Secor v. Sentis, 5 Red£. Sur. (N. Y.) 570 (1882).
21 Bailey v. Crosby, 226 Mass. 492, n6 N. E. 238 (1917).
u Secor v. Sentis, 5 Redf. Sur. (N. Y.) 570 (1882); 24 C. J. 976 (1921).
28 In re Marshall's Estate, 3 Dem. Sur. (N. Y.) 173, 67 How. Prac. 519 (1884).
=4 Ibid.
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paring the estate, a large one, for distribution. 25 A recent New York
case held that where an executor accepted appointment under a will
providing no compensation, he was entitled to no compensation as
executor, but could receive compensation for services in the capacity of
temporary administrator where the appointment was obtained in good
faith because of prospective delay in probate.28 The results reached in
these cases were probably desirable under the circumstances, but it is
difficult to avoid the conclusion that they violate the testamentary intent
in spite of their dicta to the contrary. One searches in vain for cases
depriving an executor of all compensation unless he is receiving some
other benefit under the will which mitigates the harshness of the rule.
2.

Where the will provides a specific compensation, though less than
the statutory minimum, it is easier to hold the executor bound thereby,
and the courts generally so decide. 21 The principles applied are those
of effectuating the testator's intent,211 election,29 estoppel,80 and implied
contract.81 Where some compensation is provided, there is at least consideration upon which to predicate an implied contract ( an element
absent where fees are excluded), but the courts proceeding on the contract theory are a little vague as to how the executor contracts with a
dead man. The difficulties of finding a real election or estoppel will be
considered later.
To what extent a testator may provide for more than the statutory
fee without constituting his executor a legatee is not clearly answered
in the cases. An inter vivos agreement with decedent to act as executor
for a compensation in excess of that allowed by statute is not void as
fixing compensation of a public officer or on other grounds.82 Provisions
that the executor "be paid liberally" 88 or "handsomely" 84 have been
held not to justify more than the statutory allowance. In Maryland
Fidelity Trust & Safety Vault Co. v. Watkins' Exrs., 19 Ky. L. Rep. 957, 42
753 (1897).
.
28
In re Viggiani's Estate, 171 Misc. 74, II N. Y. S. (2d) 735 (1939).
21 Vicksburg Pub. Library v. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 168 Miss. 88, 150
So. 755 (1933); 34 A. L. R. 918 (1925).
28
In re Williams' Estate, 147 Wash. 381, 266 P. 137 (1928).
29
Brown's Exr. v. Brown's Devisees, 6 Bush (69 Ky.) 648 (1869); In re Hays'
Estate, 183 Pa. St. 296, 38 A. 622 (1897).
80
Washington Loan & Trust Co. v. Convention of Protestant Episcopal Church,
54 App. D. C. 14, 293 F. 833 (1923).
81
Ross v. Conwell, 7 Ind. App. 375, 34 N. E. 752 (1893); In re Williams'
Estate, 147 Wash. 381, 266 P. 137 (1928).
32
In re McIntosh's Estate, 182 Iowa 23, 159 N. W. 223 (1916); Gordon v.
Greening, 121 Ark. 617, 182 S. W. 272 (1916), dicta to the same effect.
as Kenan v. Graham, 135 Ala. 585, 33 So. 699 (1903).
"Waddy's Exr. v. Hawkins' Admr., 4 Leigh (31 Va.) 458 (1833).
25

s. w.
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and New Jersey,85 where it is held that the statutory provision is controlling irrespective of any statement in the will, it would follow logically that a testator's provision for compensation in excess of the statutory amounts would not be given effect, but it is probable that the courts
of those states would give such provisions effect as legacies. 86 Though
a legacy to aµ executor, expressly as compensation, does not abate with
legacies which are mere bounties, even though the legacy "somewhat
exceeds" what the executor would otherwise be entitled to demand,87
it is indicated that if the amount appeared unreasonable or unearned an
abatement would be enforced if the rights of creditors were involved. 88
No good reason appears to prevent a testator's allowing more than the
statutory maximum as compensation.

3.
Statutes permitting renunciation of the specific compensation provided by will have caused considerable difficulty where the legislature
failed to set a definite time within which the renunciation must be
made. In the absence of such a provision the courts are in hopeless
conflict as to when the renunciation must be made in order to be effective. One extreme view is illustrated by a holding that qualifying 8 ;
and entering upon the performance of the duties of executor is an election to accept the compensation fixed by the will and subsequent renunciation is too late to be effectual,4° while the opposite view is that
renunciation after managing the estate for "several years" and accepting the specific compensation in the meantime is effective on the
grounds that the statute sets no time limit and therefore it is not in the
power of the court to do so.4 1. The latter court more recently held that
renunciation was not too late at the time of accounting if no injustice
resulted.' 2 The New York courts went through a curious development
on this point, first holding that the election must be made promptly or
the right would be lost by laches.'8 They later held that so long as the
executor did not indicate his election, the right to renounce remained
unimpaired" and that an agreement with the legatee to accept the
85 Tichenor v. Mechanics & Metals Nat. Bank, 96 N. J. Eq. 560, xz5 A. 323
(1924); McKim v. Duncan, 4 Gill (Md.) 72 (1846).
36
See notes 17 and 19, supra.
87
Anderson v. Dougall, 15 Grant Ch. (Up. Can.) 405 (1868).
88
Richardson v. Richardson, 145 App. Div. 540, 129 N. Y. S. 941 (1911);
Matter of Tilden, 44 Hun (N. Y.) 441 (1887).
39
Brown's Exr. v. Brown's Devisees, 6 Bush (69 Ky.) 648 (1869).
40
In re Williams' Estate, 147 Wash. 381, 266 P. 137 (1928).
4
1. Heath v. Maddock, 83 N. J. Eq. 681, 94 A. 218 (1914).
42
Parker v. Wright, 103 N. J. Eq. 535, 143 A. 870 (1928).
43
Arthur v. Nelson, l Dem. Sur. (N. Y.) 337 (1882).
44
lnr~Arkenburgh, 13 Misc. 744, 35 N. Y. S. 251 (1895).

1940]

COMMENTS

provisions of the will did not estop the executor from later renouncing
it.4 G A still later New York case held that acceptance for a period of time
of the compensation provided in the will made renunciation ineffectual.46 The New York legislature finally settled the question by an
amendment fixing a time limit of four months within which renunciation must be made.41
The recent Indiana case of Suverkrup v. Suverkrup 48 will probably
be decisive of the above question in the future in the states which have
not yet passed upon it. The case was well argued by counsel and the
decision thoroughly considered by the court. Suverkrup was named
executor under a will fixing the executor's fee. Six weeks after qualifying he filed his renunciation of the compensation provided !n the
will and claimed his statutory allowance. The statute contained no
provision as to the time in which such renunciation had to be made.411
It was strongly contended that the act of qualifying and entering upon
the duties of executor was an election to be bound by the provisions of
the will amounting to an acceptance of a contract, and that the executor
was estopped to claim more than the compensation fixed in the will.
The court, however, construed the statute as allowing the executor a
reasonable time after qualifying within which to file his renunciation,
and considering six weeks a reasonable time, allowed compensation
under the statute. The case is in accord with the weight of authority
(though there are but few cases involving this point) and seems to be
the better view. As indicated before, it is very difficult to find a real
contract and the theory of estoppel is hard to justify unless some
injury has been done or there has been a wrongful misleading on the
part of the executor; and in most cases this element is not present. In
order to avoid a bald violation of the testamentary intent, courts following the majority view frequently resort to the :fiction that the testator is presumed to know the law, and therefore has in mind the possibility of the executor electing to take the statutory allowance. n
15()

4.
Where the executor is also a legatee, certain problems are likely to
arise. The English view/ 2 and the view taken by a few early American
4

In reArkenburgh, 38 App. Div. 473, 56 N. Y. S. 523 (1899).
In re Nester, 166 App. Div. 224, 151 N. Y. S. 194 (1914).
47
In re O'Donohue's Estate, II5 Misc. 697, 181 N. Y. S. 9II (1920).
48
Suverkrup v. Suverkrup, (Ind. App. 1939) 18 N. E. (2d) 488.
49
Ind. Ann. Stat. (Burns, 1933), § 6-1417.
GO It is difficult to reconcile the contract theory with the generally accepted
doctrine that an offer lapses with the death of the offeror.
Gl In re Arkenburgh, 38 App. Div. 473, 56 N. Y. S. 523 (1899).
32
Chassaing v. Durand, 85 Md. 420, 37 A. 362 (1897).
G

46
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cases,118 was that when an executor was also a legatee he was not entitled
to a commission, but this is no longer the rule anywhere. Where a
legacy is made in lieu of commissions, all courts, with the few exceptions
mentioned earlier/' hold that the executor is not entitled to further
compensation 1111 unless he renounces under a statute permitting him to
do so. 116
Whether or not a legacy stands in lieu of commissions depends
upon the testator's intent, and where the will is silent or ambiguous on
tjiat point the courts resort to diverse presumptions. Louisiana requires
by statute that where the executor is a legatee there must be a formal
declaration in the will that the execuor shall be allowed statutory commissions in addition to the legacy before the executor will be entitled to
commissions.61 However, the prevailing view _is that a bequest to the
executor will not be held to be in lieu of compensation unless the will
clearly shows such intent; the presumption being that a bequest is a
bounty and not compensation. 118 It has been held that where a legacy
is given to a person in the character of executor, the presumption is
that the bequest is given upon condition that he perform the duties of
the office 119 and that commissions, as such, bequeathed to an executor,
constitute compensation, not a gift, and are forfeited by failure to perform properly the duties of executor by making yearly accounts.60
The courts generally accept this principle but subject it to a very strict
construction in its application. Thus, where a will gave $r,ooo to each
of two executors "as a compensation for their services," the court, believing the sum inadequate, construed the legacy as conditional only
upon acceptance of the office, and permitted an additional ten per cent
commission for services.61 Also the United States Supreme Court in a
recent tax case held that the executor need do no more than in good
faith clothe himself with the character of executor in order to receive
a legacy given in lieu of compensation.62
Jones v. Williams, 2 Call (6 Va.) 102 (1799).
See notes I 8 and 19 supra.
1111 Connolly v. Leonard, II4 Me. 29, 95 A. 269 (1915).
IIG In re O'Donohue's Estate, II5 Misc. 697, 181 N. Y. S. 9u (1920).
111 Succession of Abrams, 145 La. 627, 82 So. 727 (1919); Succession of Cucollu;
4 Rob. (La.) 397 (1843).
118 In re Cohen's Will, 128 Misc. 906, 220 N. Y. S. 509 (1927); In re Fox's
Estate, 235 Pa. 105, 83 A. 613 (1912); Campbell v. Mackie, I Dem. Sur. (N. Y.)
185 {1883).
119 Fletcher v. Hurd, 60 Hun 576, 14 N. Y. S. 388 {1891); Chassaing v. Durand,
85 Md. 420, 37 A. 362 (1897).
t1o In re Norris' Estate, 153 S. C. 203, 150 S. E. 693 (1930).
61 Raines v. Raines' Exrs., 51 Ala. 237 (1874).
62 United States v. Merriam, 263 U.S. 179, 44 S. Ct. 69 (1923). The reasoning
118

11'
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Statutes permitting renunciation are of course applicable to legacies
given in lieu of compensation and about the same problems are involved in their application. It would be easier for the courts to find a
real election and estoppel in cases where the label "legacy" rather than
"compensation" is used by the testator, because the executor is in possession of the thing bequeathed or devised, but the courts are reluctant
to do so. Where the executor Jived for several years in a house devised
him in lieu of compensation the court did not find an election or estoppel/8 and where the legacy was grossly out of proportion to reasonable
compensation the executor, who had already paid it to himself, was
treated as having accepted it on account. 6 ' Where the person named as
executor is also a legatee and the will fixes his compensation as executor, it is often contended that acceptance of the legacy prevents renunciation of the specific compensation upon the familiar doctrine that one
who accepts a benefit under a will ratifies the whole instrument.65 However, the majority view, and the one taken in the recent Suverkrup case,
is that there is no ratification because the two are not inconsistent and
require no election.66

5.
As previously intimated, the development of circumstances unforeseen by the testator may induce the courts to grant compensation other
than that provided in the will. Thus where a testator's son, appointed
executor to act without compensation, lost the advantage provided for
him in the division of the estate by reason of the widow taking against
the will, the court permitted compensation on the ground that it would
be inequitable to hold him to the provision in the will.67 Also where
the will fixed the compensation at two per cent of the net proceeds, an
amount which was wholly inadequate compensation because of unforeseen insolvency, the court increased the commission to four
per cent.68 That the courts would probably reduce an unreasonably
large fee if the estate proved insolvent was previously indicated.69
Bailey v. Crosby 10 presents an interesting method by which a testator may effectively control his executor's fees. In that case the will
of this case is not clear, and as authority for the above proposition it would probably
be limited to its peculiar facts.
68
Heath v. Maddock, 83 N. J. Eq. 681, 94 A. 218 (1914).
6
' Parker v. Wright, 103 N. J. Eq. 535, 143 A. 870 (1929).
85
Suverkrup v. Suverkrup, (Ind. App. 1939) 18 N. E. (2d) 488.
66 Ibid.
67
Frazer v. Frazer, 25 Ky. L. Rep. 473, 76 S. W. 13 (1903).
68
In re Guien's Estate, 1 Ashm. (Pa.) 317 ( I 83 I) ; In re Good's Estate, I 50
Pa. St. 301, 24 A. 624 (1892) (extraordinary circumstances held to justify granting
additional compensation).
69
See note 38, supra.
10
226 Mass. 492, u6 N. E. 289 (1917).
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provided that the executor's compensation should be such as a majority
of the heirs should award him, and the executor was held estopped to
claim more than the amount allowed by the heirs. The self-interest of
the heirs should serve as an effective check on unreasonable fees and
at the same time prevent unfairness due to changing circumstances.
The case rests on sound principles because it is easier to find a real
contract binding upon the executor than in a case where the testator
attempts to set the fee in the will. It has also been held that an agreement by the executor with the heirs and legatees to waive commissions
in consideration that the will be allowed probate without contest is
binding upon the executor,11 though a contrary conclusion was indicated
by the same court 72 in an earlier decision.
From a general survey of the statutes and decisions, it is clear that the
testator's common-law right to determine his executor's compensation
by testamentary provision has been greatly limited. 73 Though this result
seems a gross betrayal of the sacred testamentary intent, it is probably
desirable. The well-known adage about "fair weather friends" applies
to friends of the dead as well as the living. Adequate compensation still
seems a better guarantee of efficient administration than personal fidelity. A great deal of truth is contained in the somewhat cynical though
realistic statement of a Pennsylvania judge that: "Disinterested benevolence is as rare as human gratitude. The law is formed not on exceptional but on prevailing types. Hence, a policy of allowing compensation commensurate to the services and responsibility required is essential to secure the best results." 74
In re Williams' Estate, 170 N. Y. S. So (Sur. Ct. 1918).
In re Arkenburgh, 13 Misc. 744, 35 N. Y. S. 251 {1895).
73 42 YALE L. J. 771 at 778 (1933).
74 Clark's Estate, IO Pa. Dist. 378 at 379 (1901).
71

72

